Edmund Husserl's phenomenological descriptions* show many similarities to my own considerations, for example when he speaks of a "halo," a "horizon of mental processes" (awareness) or a "central point of unity" (neutral center point). Nevertheless, he does not consistently take the omnipresence of the center-periphery structure further to the infinitesimality structure.
In Husserl's model, the dynamic is treated more as a thought and an assumption than as a realization in itself. The fact that it has to be confirmed again and again,
as he says, does not mean the same thing. This is why his theory can hardly be
extended to non-human consciousness. The dynamic and the point centers-structure
he actually describes (a reduced, finite-ized "infinitesimality
structure") are not taken seriously enough. Moreover, since he does not
regard probabilities as dynamically real, he does not arrive at the concept of
freedom of choice.
Husserl's
center between subject and object, which can be understood as a non-dual
"Mu," i.e. as a unified stream of intention ("intentionality"),
is interesting. In my opinion, however, this stream must also make
distinctions, even between its directions, only without additional
self-reflection.
For
Husserl, objective objects are harmonious or uniform cores of stability of
"dynamic" perception and the pure subject is a neutral point in the
totality of perception (superimposed or surrounded by the "personal
ego"). This also comes close to freedom of choice!
Other
subjects are imputations, which are formed like stability cores, only with
(imputed) own subjective perception. Husserl's aversion to "psychologizing"
probably prevents him from taking the subconscious seriously and establishing
the reality funnel. Instead, he creates a kind of substitute that ends at the
surface. The "inner horizon" is formed only by the given senses.
Accordingly,
Husserl's essence also has no depth, no hiddenness, and is not an enfoldment.
The "dying off" of the dynamic prevents the realization of the
dynamic all-connectedness or the only alternation. A lack of infinities
prevents the necessary "lubricant." The stability of nuclei or
objects is not explained, but only determined and accepted, although it can be
broken down and explained concretely through research. Husserl does not give a
general explanation, except for repetition or habits ("habituations")
- which is not wrong, but he does not take it as far as he could.
Husserl
sees no condensate, no blurring towards the center vis-à-vis the detailed
periphery. Therefore, he cannot credibly bridge empty spaces (within the
circumscription), which makes it difficult to apply to "material"
interactions. He lacks alternation as a core concept that clearly distinguishes
between centers and equally clearly defines the formation of unity. What
Husserl describes (tendencies/references, potentials, conclusions) are
partially reflected aspects of it.
In the common center point of a community, the center points of the
different "sense units" "come to coincidence" and would
thus describe the same object. Husserl overlooks here that a point without the
difference of the "sense units" no longer has any meaningfulness. In
other words, he is not consistent here, perhaps because he feared the
consequences. Consistent would be the dynamic of the "sense units"
and the fuzzy condensate as a "communal object" (in 3D in the funnel
stem).
Husserl
also says, mutatis mutandis, that things are identified with each other in the
central point. But for me it is a mystical, asymptotically anticipated
identity. For him, it is the true object in continuous change - flatter, more
of an escape from the condensate and only seemingly more concrete. When center
points "come to coincidence," they rather lie on the same axis of the
current reality funnel. And distinguishing between the "things" of
these center points is a shift on the axis. Even seen in this way, my picture
is more dynamic: the shift would create a new center point, possibly on the
same axis.
Ultimately,
Husserl describes more of a static "delimitation" with a central
point of unity, a kind of "reality funnel in 2D," but no consistent
dynamic circumscription, no quasi-static and no freedom of choice. My point of
wholeness and his point of unity are equivalent, but the emphasis and thus the
conclusions differ.
Wholeness
is more dynamic, unity is more static. One could also say that the dynamic of
circumscription forms a wholeness and its quasi-static forms a unity. Unity
must first be produced out of the dynamic, whereas it is already implied by
"parts." "Production" is, of course, an emphasis, but it is
also much more open - the production out of a potential that can also reach
into infinity. With Husserl, however, this is a "horizon." Whoever
presents potential statically is not consistent and does not recognize the
auxiliary character of this concept. Dynamics cannot be reduced to potential;
potential is only a partial aspect of it, because it must be constantly
realized. Husserl also writes this, but he emphasizes the potential and not the
dynamic as such.
*in "Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy", first book
