How to create artificial consciousness

Is there a way to verify or falsify the central thesis of my theory?

Yes, an AI must be constructed so that it comes as close as possible to an ideal infinitesimality-structured state, and also so that this state can be brought about continuously. The continuous transition is necessary in order to be able to calculate an expected distribution of outcomes from the i-structured state from the statistical distribution of outcomes from the non-i-structured state in the event that consciousness does not occur. If the expectation occurs, the theory is falsified. If, on the other hand, “anomalies” occur, they support consciousness in the sense of the theory.

How to create artificial consciousness

I am not an engineer, but I would like to convey the idea of how we can create artificial consciousness with free will using the concept of infinitesimality structure. The basic principle is surprisingly simple and has probably already been realized here and there. We need

Justifying decisions in hindsight

The reasons we often give for our decisions are often less compelling and rational than we think – they only seem so because we have chosen them cleverly in retrospect. It is a process that helps us make our choices more certain and explainable. We look for reasons that retrospectively fit our choices into a coherent story. This story, in turn, gives us a sense of security and identity. It helps us reduce the perceived responsibility for our decision by making our choice seem logical, reasonable, and inevitable. In retrospect, the alternatives seem, so to speak, more distant from each other.

All That Is – What is Awareness? (II)

If every perspective is individual and if structures arise only from circumscribing alternations, then alternation cannot be limited to the Awareness (I) of a human being. Rather, every point of view, every place of effect must alternate and arise from alternations. (Ultimately, it is the alternation of infinitely small points of an I-structure - defined in What is Consciousness? (I)).

This consequence entails others:

1. We must basically be able to put ourselves into the individual awareness of other humans (and even non-humans). Indeed, we empathize with others; otherwise we could not communicate with them. We at least repeatedly approximate their points of view and thus converse with persons who are similar to them. If we were to put ourselves completely in their position, our consciousness would quickly be overwhelmed and would have to repress most of it into the subconscious.
2. Changing a point of view is changing the whole reality (a rearrangement of the Reality Funnel), namely from a foreseen, probable reality to an even more probable one, the present reality. As one reality takes precedence, the others fall into their subordinate position. They become or remain potential, just as the one that now takes precedence was before. But they do not disappear: They are still aware standpoints 

How is Freedom of Choice Possible?

The question of whether we can freely choose among several possibilities, without imagining this freedom or confusing it with chance, leads us to the truth about our responsibility. For if we had to answer for something that came from us but was not decided by us, it would be no more than the responsibility of a cloud for its rain.

To find the answer, let us consider the simple choice between two continuations of our day, for example, whether to go to the cinema or to the theater. Actually, we like both equally, although sometimes we feel more like one than the other. Today, however, we really don't care; we could just as well flip a coin. But we don't - that would be too cheap. We think. We put ourselves into the cinema, then into the theater, then back into the present, and so on. In this way we circumscribe the entirety of the decision situation, the present being its center. Strictly speaking, this center is infinitely small, right in the middle of the whole circumscription with all its details. That is, in us.

Circumscription and the Center: Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authored Choice

This paper develops a unified structural account of perceptual consciousness, awareness, objectivity, and free will. The core proposal is that any determinate episode instantiates an i-structure: a nested center–horizon organization generated by circumscriptions, understood as the reciprocal integration of differences into a whole. The “center” is a limit-like unity-role by which the whole is determinately one; the “horizon” is the structured field of co-implicated possibilities, constraints, background, and anticipations. I argue that the phenomenological center–horizon pattern can be treated, under a restricted transcendental move, as a condition on determinacy itself, provided one adopts a determinacy-for stance in a metaphysical sense: determinacy is inseparable from the space of possible determinations within systems of discrimination and interaction. Consciousness and awareness are then distinguished as emphases within i-structure: consciousness is stabilized thematic unity, whereas awareness is explicit openness of horizon and depth. Objectivity is characterized as communicatively stabilized approximation whose normativity lies in robustness under widening and deepening practices of determination. Finally, decision episodes are analyzed via identity- and affordance-determinacy, a crossing phase, and authored resolution. Compatibilists and libertarians share this structural target and differ primarily on the metaphysical reading of the openness in that shared structure.

Structural Libertarianism and the Veridicality of the “Up-to-Me” Experience: Psychophysical Openness, Authored Indeterminacy, and Residual Luck

This paper defends a libertarian account of free will grounded in the phenomenological structure of live decision episodes. Such episodes instantiate an i-structure, a center–periphery organization in which a focal node represents the decision situation as a whole and a periphery represents alternatives, reasons, and constraints. There is an “up-to-me” region in which the situation’s identity is fixed while what will be done remains open. I argue that the best interpretation of this up-to-me phenomenology, when taken as serious evidence about agency, is global metaphysical openness: even given the total state of the world and the total laws at a time, more than one future action is nomically possible. I make this explicit through a strengthened Psychophysical Openness Thesis (POT): psychophysical laws are probabilistic and sensitive to i-structures, constraining and biasing outcomes without deterministically fixing them. I then define authored indeterminacy as underdetermined settling whose explanatory stopping point is the agent’s reasons-integrating act rather than an independent chancemaker. Luck objections are addressed by conceding that global libertarianism entails irreducible bruteness and chance within the agent while arguing that responsibility does not require eliminating chance but locating irreducible settling within the agent’s evaluative act.

Center, Horizon, and “Taking a Stand”: A Phenomenological Map of Decision Episodes

This paper offers a phenomenological description of conscious decision episodes in which agents experience themselves as facing a live choice and “taking a stand.” It also argues that such a description supplies a structural supplement to existing accounts of decision and self-commitment, especially Moran’s account of avowal and Chang’s account of hard choices. Moran shows why deciding is not merely reporting an antecedent psychological fact; Chang shows why some choices are not settled by the balance of given reasons and may involve will-based reasons. What both accounts leave underdescribed, I argue, is how an agent can encounter a practical question as already determinate enough to be this decision now while the outcome remains open enough to require commitment. Drawing on Husserl’s object–horizon structure, Gurwitsch’s theme/field/margin, and James’s focus/fringe, I describe such episodes as instantiating an i-structure: a center–horizon pattern whose focal node gathers “this situation” as a unified whole while its horizon encodes considerations, constraints, and possibilities. I distinguish two gradients across this structure: identity-determinacy, concerning how settled “what this is” is, and affordance-determinacy, concerning how settled “what I can still do” is. Their divergence marks a crossing phase, whose resolution I call authored resolution: a commitment experienced as my doing, neither mandated by reasons alone nor random or alien.