Our striving for knowledge is a declaration of love. By gaining wisdom we are loved in return. The most basic structure of consciousness and reality deciphered and a real solution to the problem of free will. Whoever distinguishes, decides. By Claus Janew.
The Self, Emptiness, and Awareness
Truthfulness. The Consciousness that Creates Reality
Authentic
Radical constructivism - a hollow shell?
Radical constructivism was initially formulated by Ernst von Glasersfeld.
Radical constructivists do not speak of creating reality, but of
constructing reality. What is the difference?
"Creating reality" ultimately means creating everything, without exception. "Constructing reality"
means interpreting external "disturbances" and thus shaping effects.
Thus the constructivist has the lesser claim, but at the price of
inconsistency. He cannot avoid including an external cause of effect that essentially
determines his construction. In principle, however, he cannot and does not want
to know by what this obviously pre-structured effect is exerted. What is
important is only what is useful in the context of one's own life, whereby
"usefulness" is equally constructed and thus co-determined by this
external something, and so on.
Instead, he might well admit that there is an external reality, the effect of which he is only further constructing. But he would not be saying anything essentially new. And once he admits its pre-structuring, he might as well go on to ask what else there is to "pre-recognize". And with that, he abolishes the radicality of constructivism.
Center, Horizon, and “Taking a Stand”: A Phenomenological Map of Decision Episodes
This paper offers a phenomenological description of conscious decision episodes in which agents experience themselves as facing a live choice and “taking a stand.” It also argues that such a description supplies a structural supplement to existing accounts of decision and self-commitment, especially Moran’s account of avowal and Chang’s account of hard choices. Moran shows why deciding is not merely reporting an antecedent psychological fact; Chang shows why some choices are not settled by the balance of given reasons and may involve will-based reasons. What both accounts leave underdescribed, I argue, is how an agent can encounter a practical question as already determinate enough to be this decision now while the outcome remains open enough to require commitment. Drawing on Husserl’s object–horizon structure, Gurwitsch’s theme/field/margin, and James’s focus/fringe, I describe such episodes as instantiating an i-structure: a center–horizon pattern whose focal node gathers “this situation” as a unified whole while its horizon encodes considerations, constraints, and possibilities. I distinguish two gradients across this structure: identity-determinacy, concerning how settled “what this is” is, and affordance-determinacy, concerning how settled “what I can still do” is. Their divergence marks a crossing phase, whose resolution I call authored resolution: a commitment experienced as my doing, neither mandated by reasons alone nor random or alien.
