Mind-Expanding
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Our striving for knowledge is a declaration of love. By gaining wisdom we are loved in return. The most basic structure of consciousness and reality deciphered and a real solution to the problem of free will. Whoever distinguishes, decides. By Claus Janew.
| Claus Janew |
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The Original German version is here.
This is a collection of unpublished reflections on the structural conditions underlying consciousness, agency, and perception. Central is the concept of infinitesimality structure, a theoretical framework that aims to reconcile determinacy and indeterminacy in decision-making processes and perceptual experience. Building on my major work, How Consciousness Creates Reality – The Full Version, I assume that consciousness emerges through dynamic processes of condensation, approximation, and alternation.
If we ask for the one cause that repeatedly leads to human misbehavior against our better judgment, we find the lack of a sense of connection with others, with the environment, and with everything higher. If we had it, we would be aware that everything is a single movement of consciousness, that every experience flows into all other experiences and draws from the dynamic balance of a deep wholeness. On the one hand, this comprehensive balance allows us to be flexible with our own mental and social balance without falling into a bottomless pit. On the other hand, flexibility on a smaller scale is a good way to maintain stability on a larger scale.
I have been trying to understand how people come to their opinions. Pure logic and impartiality are rare - largely independent of intelligence. Emotions constantly distort thinking in one direction or another. Fear of something in particular does this. Often subliminally, but you can see it very well if you pay attention. In discussions, I can sometimes see, as if under a microscope, how someone fails to think ahead at a particular point, but always turns back to what is pleasant. And, of course, the appearance of rationality has to be maintained.
The stem of the Reality Funnel summarizes the
alternation of the less conscious points of view "perspectively". But
if they don't just jump around there, they also have a closer effect on each
other and are wound up in places to cores that harmoniously connect many perspectives. (Without harmony, they
would fall apart again.)
Such a comparatively harmonious core, such as our inner self, can hold our Awareness (I) together, and from it probably emanate more comprehensively harmonizing impulses for thought and action than from the adjusting roles of our little ego. On the other hand, this ego can often handle everyday situations better. Therefore, it is best if each one devotes itself to its own subject and benefits only from the skills of the other. We can feel such a harmony like a beautiful concert. If, on the other hand, the ego is completely in tune with the inner self, we can speak of unity, but hardly of harmony: The connection is too rigid and the duet probably short.
When we
weigh between two alternatives, say between job A and job B, we weigh between
their respective priorities. Each job
has a certain probability of realization, which can change during the weighing,
whereupon the probability of the other job immediately adjusts. That is, if we
prefer job B, job A becomes less probable, but remains available in the
background for a while. With job B we choose an individual probability hierarchy as such to our reality.
What about the other candidates? They and their choices are also part of our probability hierarchy. They are aspects of our individual Awareness, which as a whole decides for a new individual reality, for a new probability hierarchy. This means in reverse: The other candidates have their own awareness and choose their own probability hierarchies. We all meet in the respective awareness, but we do not merge.
The question of whether we can freely choose among
several possibilities, without imagining this freedom or confusing it with
chance, leads us to the truth about our responsibility. For if we had to answer
for something that came from us but was not decided
by us, it would be no more than the responsibility of a cloud for its rain.
To find the answer, let us consider the simple choice between two continuations of our day, for example, whether to go to the cinema or to the theater. Actually, we like both equally, although sometimes we feel more like one than the other. Today, however, we really don't care; we could just as well flip a coin. But we don't - that would be too cheap. We think. We put ourselves into the cinema, then into the theater, then back into the present, and so on. In this way we circumscribe the entirety of the decision situation, the present being its center. Strictly speaking, this center is infinitely small, right in the middle of the whole circumscription with all its details. That is, in us.
This paper defends a libertarian account of free will grounded in the phenomenological structure of live decision episodes. Such episodes instantiate an i-structure, a center–periphery organization in which a focal node represents the decision situation as a whole and a periphery represents alternatives, reasons, and constraints. There is an “up-to-me” region in which the situation’s identity is fixed while what will be done remains open. I argue that the best interpretation of this up-to-me phenomenology, when taken as serious evidence about agency, is global metaphysical openness: even given the total state of the world and the total laws at a time, more than one future action is nomically possible. I make this explicit through a strengthened Psychophysical Openness Thesis (POT): psychophysical laws are probabilistic and sensitive to i-structures, constraining and biasing outcomes without deterministically fixing them. I then define authored indeterminacy as underdetermined settling whose explanatory stopping point is the agent’s reasons-integrating act rather than an independent chancemaker. Luck objections are addressed by conceding that global libertarianism entails irreducible bruteness and chance within the agent while arguing that responsibility does not require eliminating chance but locating irreducible settling within the agent’s evaluative act.
This paper offers a phenomenological description of conscious decision episodes in which agents experience themselves as facing a live choice and “taking a stand.” It also argues that such a description supplies a structural supplement to existing accounts of decision and self-commitment, especially Moran’s account of avowal and Chang’s account of hard choices. Moran shows why deciding is not merely reporting an antecedent psychological fact; Chang shows why some choices are not settled by the balance of given reasons and may involve will-based reasons. What both accounts leave underdescribed, I argue, is how an agent can encounter a practical question as already determinate enough to be this decision now while the outcome remains open enough to require commitment. Drawing on Husserl’s object–horizon structure, Gurwitsch’s theme/field/margin, and James’s focus/fringe, I describe such episodes as instantiating an i-structure: a center–horizon pattern whose focal node gathers “this situation” as a unified whole while its horizon encodes considerations, constraints, and possibilities. I distinguish two gradients across this structure: identity-determinacy, concerning how settled “what this is” is, and affordance-determinacy, concerning how settled “what I can still do” is. Their divergence marks a crossing phase, whose resolution I call authored resolution: a commitment experienced as my doing, neither mandated by reasons alone nor random or alien.