Is There a Constant Reality?

If we can exist only in the constant change of the point of view (sensory, psychic, mental) and this must apply analogously to every place of effect (hardly has it worked, it is different), how then stability, something constant arises?

Of course, by repeating the alternation: of thought, of way of looking at things, of mutual confirmation, of effect. Quite exactly, the change can be repeated only for an infinitely short moment; then it must already reach beyond the repetition in order not to cancel itself out. That is, it changes altogether and thereby remains open. For stabilization, approximate repetition is sufficient, though. So we believe approximately the same thing for a long time.  

Circumscription and the Center: Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authored Choice

This paper develops a unified structural account of perceptual consciousness, awareness, objectivity, and free will. The core proposal is that any determinate episode instantiates an i-structure: a nested center–horizon organization generated by circumscriptions, understood as the reciprocal integration of differences into a whole. The “center” is a limit-like unity-role by which the whole is determinately one; the “horizon” is the structured field of co-implicated possibilities, constraints, background, and anticipations. I argue that the phenomenological center–horizon pattern can be treated, under a restricted transcendental move, as a condition on determinacy itself, provided one adopts a determinacy-for stance in a metaphysical sense: determinacy is inseparable from the space of possible determinations within systems of discrimination and interaction. Consciousness and awareness are then distinguished as emphases within i-structure: consciousness is stabilized thematic unity, whereas awareness is explicit openness of horizon and depth. Objectivity is characterized as communicatively stabilized approximation whose normativity lies in robustness under widening and deepening practices of determination. Finally, decision episodes are analyzed via identity- and affordance-determinacy, a crossing phase, and authored resolution. Compatibilists and libertarians share this structural target and differ primarily on the metaphysical reading of the openness in that shared structure.

Objecthood as Alternation: Dynamic Existence and the Infinitesimal Center

This paper develops a phenomenological ontology of objecthood centered on alternation. Existing accounts of horizonality, embodiment, affordance, Gestalt organization, and sensorimotor availability have shown that objects are given through profiled and transformable modes of access rather than as complete self-present units. The remaining problem is how such transformations become transformations of one object rather than a succession of appearances or a loose plurality of capacities. I argue that objecthood requires alternation: returnable transition among distinguishable phases. Such transitions condense around what I call an infinitesimal center: the unity-function through which a differentiated manifold is gathered as one object. The phenomenological thesis is that an object appears as one only through structured alternation within and between standpoints. The ontological thesis is that objecthood, as objecthood, is best understood as dynamic relational individuation rather than static self-presence. The resulting view, dynamic existence, accepts the realist force of object-resistance while rejecting static givenness as an explanation of object-unity. Objectivity is not viewlessness, but stabilized transposability among standpoints.