Edmund Husserl's phenomenological descriptions* show many similarities to my own considerations, for example when he speaks of a "halo," a "horizon of mental processes" (awareness) or a "central point of unity" (neutral center point). Nevertheless, he does not consistently take the omnipresence of the center-periphery structure further to the infinitesimality structure.
In Husserl's model, the dynamic is treated more as a thought and an assumption than as a realization in itself. The fact that it has to be confirmed again and again, as he says, does not mean the same thing. This is why his theory can hardly be extended to non-human consciousness. The dynamic and the point centers-structure he actually describes (a reduced, finite-ized "infinitesimality structure") are not taken seriously enough. Moreover, since he does not regard probabilities as dynamically real, he does not arrive at the concept of freedom of choice.
Husserl's center between subject and object, which can be understood as a non-dual "Mu," i.e. as a unified stream of intention ("intentionality"), is interesting. In my opinion, however, this stream must also make distinctions, even between its directions, only without additional self-reflection.
For Husserl, objective objects are harmonious or uniform cores of stability of "dynamic" perception and the pure subject is a neutral point in the totality of perception (superimposed or surrounded by the "personal ego"). This also comes close to freedom of choice!
Other subjects are imputations, which are formed like stability cores, only with (imputed) own subjective perception. Husserl's aversion to "psychologizing" probably prevents him from taking the subconscious seriously and establishing the reality funnel. Instead, he creates a kind of substitute that ends at the surface. The "inner horizon" is formed only by the given senses.
Accordingly, Husserl's essence also has no depth, no hiddenness, and is not an enfoldment. The "dying off" of the dynamic prevents the realization of the dynamic all-connectedness or the only alternation. A lack of infinities prevents the necessary "lubricant." The stability of nuclei or objects is not explained, but only determined and accepted, although it can be broken down and explained concretely through research. Husserl does not give a general explanation, except for repetition or habits ("habituations") - which is not wrong, but he does not take it as far as he could.
Husserl sees no condensate, no blurring towards the center vis-à-vis the detailed periphery. Therefore, he cannot credibly bridge empty spaces (within the circumscription), which makes it difficult to apply to "material" interactions. He lacks alternation as a core concept that clearly distinguishes between centers and equally clearly defines the formation of unity. What Husserl describes (tendencies/references, potentials, conclusions) are partially reflected aspects of it.
In the common center point of a community, the center points of the different "sense units" "come to coincidence" and would thus describe the same object. Husserl overlooks here that a point without the difference of the "sense units" no longer has any meaningfulness. In other words, he is not consistent here, perhaps because he feared the consequences. Consistent would be the dynamic of the "sense units" and the fuzzy condensate as a "communal object" (in 3D in the funnel stem).
Husserl also says, mutatis mutandis, that things are identified with each other in the central point. But for me it is a mystical, asymptotically anticipated identity. For him, it is the true object in continuous change - flatter, more of an escape from the condensate and only seemingly more concrete. When center points "come to coincidence," they rather lie on the same axis of the current reality funnel. And distinguishing between the "things" of these center points is a shift on the axis. Even seen in this way, my picture is more dynamic: the shift would create a new center point, possibly on the same axis.
Ultimately, Husserl describes more of a static "delimitation" with a central point of unity, a kind of "reality funnel in 2D," but no consistent dynamic circumscription, no quasi-static and no freedom of choice. My point of wholeness and his point of unity are equivalent, but the emphasis and thus the conclusions differ.
Wholeness is more dynamic, unity is more static. One could also say that the dynamic of circumscription forms a wholeness and its quasi-static forms a unity. Unity must first be produced out of the dynamic, whereas it is already implied by "parts." "Production" is, of course, an emphasis, but it is also much more open - the production out of a potential that can also reach into infinity. With Husserl, however, this is a "horizon." Whoever presents potential statically is not consistent and does not recognize the auxiliary character of this concept. Dynamics cannot be reduced to potential; potential is only a partial aspect of it, because it must be constantly realized. Husserl also writes this, but he emphasizes the potential and not the dynamic as such.
*in "Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy", first book
