This paper develops a phenomenological ontology of objecthood centered on
alternation. Existing accounts of horizonality, embodiment, affordance,
Gestalt organization, and sensorimotor availability have shown that objects
are given through profiled and transformable modes of access rather than as
complete self-present units. The remaining problem is how such transformations
become transformations of one object rather than a succession of appearances
or a loose plurality of capacities. I argue that objecthood requires
alternation: returnable transition among distinguishable phases. Such
transitions condense around what I call an infinitesimal center: the
unity-function through which a differentiated manifold is gathered as one
object. The phenomenological thesis is that an object appears as one only
through structured alternation within and between standpoints. The ontological
thesis is that objecthood, as objecthood, is best understood as dynamic
relational individuation rather than static self-presence. The resulting view,
dynamic existence, accepts the realist force of object-resistance while
rejecting static givenness as an explanation of object-unity. Objectivity is
not viewlessness, but stabilized transposability among standpoints.
